(Bamidbar 35:12) "And the cities shall be for you as a refuge from the avenger. And the slayer shall not die until he stand before the congregation for judgment.": What is the intent of this? Because it is written (Ibid. 27) "And if the avenger kill the slayer (outside the city of refuge), he has no blood" (on his hands), I might think (he may kill him even) immediately. It is, therefore, written "And the slayer shall not die (at the hands of the avenger) until he stand before the congregation for judgment" (and is pronounced an exile.) (Bamidbar 35:13) "And the cities which you shall provide — six cities of refuge shall there be for you.": together with the first (three designated by Moses across the Jordan). You say, together with the first. But perhaps (the meaning is) exclusive of the first? (Ibid. 14) "The three cities shall you provide across the Jordan, and the three cities shall you provide in the land of Canaan" indicates "together with the first." And they are (Devarim 4:43) "Betzer in the desert in the land of the plain for (the tribes of) Reuven; Ramoth in Gilead for Gad; and Golan in Bashan for Menasheh. And, corresponding to them, three in the land of Canaan, viz. (Joshua 20:7) "And they set aside Kedesh in the Galil in the hill (country) of Naftali, and Shechem in the hill of Ephraim, and Kiryath Arba, which is Chevron, in the hill of Yehudah." We find, then, the two and a half tribes across the Jordan corresponding (in this respect) to the nine and a half tribes in the land of Canaan, most of the spillers of blood residing in Gilead. As it is written (Hoshea 6:8) "Gilead, the city of the workers of wrong, steeped in blood." (Bamidbar 35:13) "cities of refuge shall there be for you": What is the intent of this? I derive that they provide refuge only for those (who killed) in the land. Whence do I derive (the same for those) outside the land? From "shall there be for you" (— in any event). (Ibid. 15) "for the children of Israel": This tells me (that they provide refuge only) for (native) Israelites. Whence do I derive the same for proselytes and sojourners? From (Ibid.) "and for the proselyte and the sojourner in their midst." But perhaps (the meaning is that) just as a sojourning proselyte is exiled for (unwittingly killing) another, so, he is exiled for (unwittingly killing) an Israelite, and an Israelite is exiled for (unwittingly killing) him? — It is, therefore, written "for you." How so? If an Israelite killed him, he is exempt. If he killed an Israelite, he is killed. "shall these six cities be for refuge": What is the intent of this? From (14) "The three cities shall you provide across the Jordan," I might think that the first that is set aside provides refuge (immediately). It is, therefore, written "shall these six cities be for refuge," Scripture hereby apprising us that one (city) does not afford refuge until all have been set aside. (Bamidbar 35:16) "And if with an iron implement he kill him (intentionally) and he die, he is a murderer.": What is the intent of this? From (17) "And if with a hand-stone … (18) Or if with a wooden implement, etc.", I might think that he is liable only if he killed him with one of these. Whence would I derive (the same for) iron? It is, therefore, written "And if with an iron implement he kill him, he is a murderer." — But (even) without this I can derive it a fortiori, viz.: If he is liable for killing him with stone or wood, how much more so with iron! — But if so, I would say: Just as a stone must fill the hand (thus "hand-stone"), so, iron. It is, therefore, written with an implement of iron, (of any size). It is revealed before the Holy One Blessed be He that iron of any size can kill, wherefore "hand" is not written (in that connection) — even a needle or a pin sufficing. This tells me only of his killing him with iron. Whence do I derive the same for his throwing at him metal balls or lumps? From (16) "He is a murderer; die shall die the murderer" — in any event. (17) "And if with a hand-stone, whereby he can die, he strike him and he die, he is a murderer. Die shall die the murderer.": What is the intent of this? From (Shemot 21:18) "And if men quarrel and a man strike his neighbor, etc." I might think (that this obtains) whether he strikes him with something which is or which is not lethal. It is, therefore, written "And if with a hand-stone (i.e., one which fills the hand), whereby he can die, he strike him." Scripture hereby apprises us that he is not liable unless he strikes him with something which is potentially lethal. I might think, even (if he strike him) on a (body) site (a blow to) which is not mortal. It is, therefore, written (Devarim 19:11) "And if a man hate his neighbor … and he strike him mortally" — whereby we are apprised that he is not liable unless he strikes him with something which is potentially lethal and on a (body) site, injury to which may result in his death. This ("And if with a hand-stone") tells me that he is liable only if he kills him with a stone. Whence do I derive (the same for) his rolling rocks or pillars over him? From (17) "he is a murderer — die shall die the murderer" — in any event. (Bamidbar 35:18) "Or if with a wooden hand-implement, whereby he can die, he strike him, and he die, he is a murderer." What is the intent of this? From (Shemot 21:20) "And if a man strike his (Canaanite) man-servant or maid-servant with a rod, and he die under his hand, vengeance (by the sword) shall be taken," I might think, whether or not it is of killing potential. It is, therefore, written "Or if with a wooden hand-implement, whereby he can die, he strike him, etc." — only if it is of killing potential. I might think, even on a (body) site injury to which does not result in death. It is, therefore, written (Devarim 19:11) "And if a man hate his neighbor and lie in wait for him, and he rise up against him and he strike him mortally," Scripture hereby apprising us that he is not liable unless he strikes him on a (body) site injury to which may result in death. This ("Or, if with a wooden implement") tells me that he is liable only if he struck him with wood. Whence do I derive (the same for) his throwing beams or poles at him? From "he is a murderer — die shall die the murderer" — in any event. (Bamidbar 35:19) "the avenger, he shall kill the murderer": The mitzvah is the avenger's. Whence is it derived that if he has no avenger, beth-din designates one for him? From "The avenger, he shall kill the murderer when he comes upon him" — in any event. (Bamidbar 35:20) "And if in hatred he thrust him": What is the intent of this? From "And if with an iron implement," "And if with a hand-stone," "Or if with a wooden hand-implement," I might think that he is liable only if he killed him with these. Whence do I derive (the same for) other things? It follows by induction from all three, viz.: Stone is not like wood; wood is not like stone; and both are not like iron. And iron is not like both. What is common to all three is that they are potentially lethal, and if one killed (by them), it is a mitzvah for the avenger to kill him. This tells me only of his killing with these. Whence do I derive that he is likewise liable if he pushed him off the top of a roof and he fell and died? From "And if in hatred he thrust him" — in any event. — But perhaps even if he pushed him into water or fire or incited a dog or a snake against him? It follows (that this is not so) by induction from all three, viz.: Stone is not like wood and wood is not like stone and both are not like iron and iron is not like both. What is common to all three is that they are potentially lethal and he killed (by wielding them), in which instance he is liable — to exclude his thrusting him into fire or water or inciting a snare against him, in which instance his (the victim's) judgment is relegated to "Heaven." "or if he hurl aught at him in prey": (i.e.,) if he "hunted" him with intent to kill. (Bamidbar 35:21) "Or if in hatred he strike him with his hand": What is the intent of this? From "And if with an iron implement," "And if with a hand-stone," "Or if with a wooden implement," I would think that he is liable only with these. Whence do I derive (that he is likewise liable) if he crushed, strangled, kicked, or trampled him? From "with his hand" — in any manner. "The avenger shall kill the murderer": What is the intent of this? Is it not already written (19) "The avenger, he shall kill the murderer"? I might think that (this obtains) only with one who has an avenger. Whence do I derive (the same for) one who does not have an avenger? From "The avenger" — in any event. (Bamidbar 35:22) "And if of a sudden, without hatred, he thrust him": to exclude (his killing) unwittingly. "or he cast upon him some instrument, but not in prey": without "hunting" or intent to kill. (22) "Or with any stone, whereby one can die," "without seeing": to include (for exile) a blind man and one who throws (a stone) at night. R. Yehudah says: "without seeing": to exclude a blind man. "and he not be his foe": Issi b. Akiva says: We find his stringency to be his lenity, and his lenity, his stringency, viz.: You cannot make him liable for the death penalty — Perhaps he killed him unwittingly. And you cannot make him liable for exile — Perhaps he killed him wittingly. "and he not be his foe" (juxtaposed with [24] "Then the congregation shall judge"): to exclude haters from sitting in judgment. This tells me of haters. Whence do we derive the same for kin? From (24) "between the slayer and the avenger" (with no other "relationship" intervening). Whence do I derive the same for witnesses? It follows, viz.: The Torah states: Kill through (the agency of) judges, kill through witnesses. Just as judges who are (their) haters or kin are unfit (to judge in their case), so, witnesses (who are haters or kin). Furthermore, it follows a fortiori, viz.: If judges — who do not decide (the facts of the case) — haters and kin are unfit to serve (as judges), then witnesses — who decide (the facts of the case) — how much more so are haters and kin unfit to serve (as witnesses)! This tells me only of (the instance of a murderer). Whence do I derive (the same for) all other instances of the death penalty? From [the superfluous] (Ibid.) "according to these judgments." This tells me only of Israelites. Whence do I derive the same for proselytes? From (Vayikra 24:22) "for proselytes and native-born (Israelites) alike." This tells me only of capital cases. Whence do I derive (the same for) monetary cases? From (Ibid.) "One (standard of) judgment shall there be for you," — But perhaps just as capital cases (are adjudicated) by twenty-three, so, monetary cases? It is, therefore, written (here) "according to these (capital) judgments." These are (adjudicated) by twenty-three, and not monetary judgments, of which it is written (Shemot 22:8) "Until elohim (counting three judges) shall come the dispute of both." And whence is it derived that capital cases (are adjudicated) by twenty-three? From (Bamidbar 35:24) "And the congregation (ten) shall judge" (25) And the congregation (ten) shall rescue" — twenty all together. And whence is it derived that three are added? From (Shemot 23:2) "Do not be after the many to do evil," I understand that I should be with them to do good. If so, what is the intent of (Ibid.) "After the many (i.e., the majority to incline" (judgment)? Let your judgment for good (i.e., acquittal) not be like your judgment for evil (i.e., incrimination). I still would not know how many, (but the Torah states: Kill by witnesses; kill by the inclination of the judges. Just as witnesses are two, so, the inclination of the judges (i.e., acquittal, is with a majority of one, and incrimination by a majority of two); and since the verdict of beth-din cannot be evenly balanced, three most be added to them (the twenty). The expounders of metaphor stated: The three "eduyoth" ("congregants") written in this section (one in [24] and two in [27]) signal that capital cases are adjudicated by thirty. (Bamidbar 35:25) "And the congregation shall return him": From here you learn that those who kill, either unwittingly or wittingly, repair to the cities of refuge, and beth-din send and bring them from there. One who is found liable for the death penalty is killed. One who is not found liable is let go. One who is found liable for exile is returned to his place, as it is written "and the congregation shall return him to his city of refuge." "and he shall dwell there until the death of the high-priest": R. Meir says: A murderer shortens a man's days, and the high-priest lengthens a man's days. It is not fitting that the "shortener" should stand before the "lengthener." Rebbi says: A murderer defiles the land and removes the Shechinah, and the high-priest causes the Shechinah to repose on the land. It is not fitting that he who defiles the land should stand before him who causes the Shechinah to repose upon the land. (Bamidbar 35:26) "And if the murderer go beyond the border of the city of refuge … (27) the avenger may slay the murderer": R. Elazar b. Azaryah said: If under the measure of punishment, the lesser (of the two measures), one who steps one step (beyond the permitted limits) is liable for his soul, then under the measure of reward, the greater, how much more so (is his soul ennobled by an "extra step" for a mitzvah)! (37) "And the avenger find him": any man (i.e., not only the literal "blood-avenger," his kin). (38) "For in the city of his refuge shall he dwell": whence it is derived: If one killed in that city (to which he had been exiled), he is exiled from one neighborhood (in that city) to another. And a Levite (who lives in a city of refuge) is exiled from that city to another. "and after the death of the high-priest, the slayer shall return to the land of his holding": but not to his (previous high) position. These are the words of R Yehudah. R. Meir says: even to his position.
Sifrei Bamidbar 160
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