(Bamidbar 30:2) "And Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes": What is the intent of this? From (Ibid. 10:3) "And when they (the Cohanim) blow (tekiah) with them (the shofaroth) then all the congregation shall gather unto you," and (Ibid. 4) "And if they blow (tekiah) with one, there shall gather unto you the chiefs," we do not know where (they are to gather). It is (therefore) written "tekiah" re the congregation, and "tekiah" re the chiefs. Just as the congregation, (Ibid. 3) "to the door of the tent of meeting," so, the chiefs, at the door of the tent of meeting. — But perhaps all that is first in Scripture (i.e., "congregation") is first in act? It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 30:2) "to the heads of the tribes" (and then to the tribes). Since "spoke" is written in the Torah unqualified (as to whom he is speaking first), and in one instance (i.e., this one) it is specified that the chiefs take precedence to the congregation, it is, likewise, assumed in all such instances that the chiefs take precedence to the congregation. R. Yonathan says: This (derivation) is not necessary. It is already written Shemot 34:31-32) "And Moses called to them, and there returned to him all the chiefs of the congregation, and Moses would speak to them. And after that, all the children of Israel would approach and he would command them, etc." Since "speaking" is written in the Torah unqualified (as to whom he is speaking first), and in one instance it is specified that the chiefs take precedence to the congregation, so, this is assumed in all such instances. If so, why need it be written (here) "to the heads of the tribes"? To indicate that the permitting (i.e., absolution) of vows is through experts alone. "This is the thing": We are hereby apprised that just as the prophets prophesied by "Thus said the L-rd," so did Moses, viz. (Shemot 11:4), and, in addition, "This is the thing, etc." Variantly: This is the "word" (for the absolution of vows.) A husband "annuls" ("mefer" [his wife's vows, viz. Bamidbar 30:9]), but a sage does not annul. A sage "permits" ("matir" [viz. Bamidbar 30:3]) but a husband does not permit. For would it not follow otherwise, viz.: If he who does not annul, permits, then he who does annul, how much more so should he permit. And if he who does not permit, annuls, then he who does permit, how much more so should he annul! It is, therefore, written "This is the 'word' that the L-rd has commanded": The husband "annuls," and a sage does not annul. A sage "permits," and the husband does not permit. (Bamidbar 30:3) "A man, if he vow a vow, etc.": "A man": to exclude a minor. — But this would exclude (both) a minor and one who is thirteen years and one day old! — It follows (by induction that it does not), viz.: It is written here "vow," and elsewhere (Ibid. 6:2) "vow." Just as there, "ki yafli" (i.e., if he can clearly articulate his vow), so, here — whence it was ruled: If he were thirteen years and one day old, his vows stand. If he were twelve years and one day old, his vows are examined (for the yafli factor). "if he vow a vow": (The meaning is:) If he "supports" his vow by something that is vowed (e.g., "I vow not to eat X just as (I am forbidden to eat) an offering" [i.e., something that is vowed]), it is a vow. Otherwise, it is not a vow. — But perhaps (the meaning is) that it is not a vow until he appends to it (Ibid.) "to the L-rd"? It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 6:2) "to vow a vow" — in any event (i.e., even without appending "to the L-rd.") — But perhaps, just as with vows, if he supports his vow by something which is a vow, it is a vow, and, otherwise, not — so with oaths? It is, therefore, written (in respect to oaths) (Ibid. 30:3) "to bind a bond" — in any event (i.e., even without such support). Why is there a difference between vows and oaths (in this regard)? Vows are like vowing by the life of the king. Oaths, (in that they must be in the name of the L-rd) are like swearing by the King Himself. And even though there is no proof for this (distinction) it is intimated in (II Kings 4:20) "As the L-rd lives, and as you (King David) live." "to bind a bond upon his soul": Upon his soul he binds (i.e., forbids), but he does not bind upon others (i.e., his wife [i.e., he cannot confirm (in advance of her making them) all the vows that his wife will make (in his absence)]. For it would follow otherwise, viz.: If where he cannot annul his own vows once he has made them, he can annul his own vows before he has made them, then where he can annul his wife's vows once she has made them, how much more so can he annul his wife's vows before she has made them! And if he can do this, it follows that he can confirm them before she makes them. In the words of R. Eliezer: I might think that just as he can annul (her vows) before she makes them, so can he confirm them before she makes them — it is, therefore, written "to bind a bond upon his soul" — Upon his soul he binds, but he does not bind upon others. Variantly: What is the intent of "to bind a bond upon his soul"? Because it is written (Ibid.) "According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do," I might think, even if he swore to eat neveiloth and treifoth, forbidden animals and reptiles. It is, therefore, written "to bind a bond" — to bind (i.e., to forbid) what is permitted, and not to permit what is forbidden. Variantly: What is the intent of "upon his soul"? From "According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do," I might think, only if he spoke it. Whence do I derive (the same for) his accepting it upon himself (inwardly) by vow or oath? It is, therefore, written "upon his soul." "lo yachel devaro": He shall not make his word "chullin" ("profane"). If he were a sage, (even though he annuls for others), he should not annul for himself. For it would follow otherwise, viz.: If he annuls for others, should he not annul for himself? It is, therefore, written (to negate this): "He shall not make his (own) words "chullin." "lo yachel devaro": This tells us (that if he breaks his vow) he is in transgression of "lo yachel." Whence is it derived that he is also in transgression of "You shall not delay"? From (Devarim 23:22) "If you make a vow to the L-rd your G-d, you shall not delay to pay it" — whence we derive that he is in transgression of both. R. Eliezer says: This ("You shall not delay") is to equate (verbal) expression (i.e., vowing) with swearing. R. Akiva says: "According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do" — to equate expression with swearing ("According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do.") [followed by] "And a woman, etc." A woman is hereby being likened to a man, viz.: Just as a man transgresses both ("breaking" and "delaying") so, a woman. "And a woman": I might think, when she has matured; it is, therefore, written (Bamidbar 30:17) "in her maidenhood." If so, I might think, even a minor. It is, therefore written "And a woman." How is this to be resolved? (We are speaking of a stage) where she has left the status of a minor and not yet achieved maturity. Whence is it derived that she is subject to vowing? It is written here "vow," and elsewhere (Ibid. 6:2) "vow." Just as "vowing" there connotes "hafla'ah" (distinctness of expression), so, "vow" here connotes "hafla'ah" — whence they ruled: The vows of a girl of twelve years and a day stand. Those of a girl of eleven are "examined" (for "hafla'ah"). "if she vow a vow": If she "supports" her vow by something which is vowed (see above), it is a vow. Otherwise, it is not a vow. You say this, but perhaps (the meaning is) that it is not a vow until he appends to it (Ibid.) "to the L-rd"? It is, therefore, written "to vow a vow" — in any event (i.e., even without appending "to the L-rd.") It is the first assumption, then, which is to be accepted. "and she binds a bond": This connotes an oath, as it is written (Ibid. 11) "or she bound a bond on her soul by an oath." "in her father's house": in her father's domain — to include her having been widowed or divorced from betrothal (vis-à-vis her father's prerogative in her vows). — But perhaps it is to be understood literally, even after her marriage (i.e., that even then if she vowed while in her father's house, the father may annul the vow?) It is, therefore, written "in her father's house in her youth." (Scripture is speaking of one) all of whose youth was spent in her father's house — to exclude one who was widowed or divorced in marriage, all of her youth not having been spent in her father's house. (Bamidbar 30:5) "If her father hear her vow": to exclude one who is deaf. "If her father hear": this tells me only of her father's hearing (her vow). Whence do I derive (the same for) his being told (of it) by others? From (6) "on the day that he hears." "and he be silent to her": He must intend her. If his daughter vowed, and he said "I thought it was my wife," he may (later) annul her vow (for it was never confirmed by his silence.) For it is written "and he be silent to her": He must intend her. "Then all of her vows shall stand, and every bond wherewith she bound her soul shall stand": If she vowed and he confirmed it (by his silence), and then he annulled it, I might think that it is annulled. And how would I understand "Then all of her vows shall stand"? (As meaning) if he did not (later) annul them. Or, (am I to understand it as meaning that they stand) even if he did annul them, (their having been confirmed by his original silence)? And how would I understand (6) "And if her father constrain her, (which implies that he can annul them)? If he never confirmed them (by his silence.) Of, even if he did confirm them, (if he then annulled them, they are annulled?) It is, therefore, written "shall stand," Scripture hereby apprising us that every vow, if it were confirmed for one instant, cannot thereafter be annulled. (Bamidbar 30:6) "And if her father constrain her": I would not know what this "constraint" was were it not written (Ibid. 9) "And if on the day that her husband hear, he constrain her and annul the vow" — whence I derive that "constraint" is annulment. — We learn vis-à-vis the husband that "constraint" is annulment. Whence do we derive (the same for) the father? And, furthermore, we find vis-à-vis the husband that (his) silence on the day of his hearing is equated with the day of the vow for confirmation. Whence do we derive (the same for) the father? It follows (by induction), viz.: If he (the father) is permitted to confirm and he is permitted to annul, then if I have learned about annulment that silence on the day of his hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow, then for confirmation, too, silence on the day of his hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow. — No, this may be true of annulment, where there is a distinction in the rule, (annulment in the heart not being considered annulment), wherefore silence on the day of hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow, as opposed to confirmation, where no such distinction exists. Not succeeding (in deriving it in the above manner) I will derive it from (what obtains with) the husband, viz.: Since the husband annuls and the father annuls, then just as with the husband, silence on the day of his hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow, then the same obtains with the father, too. Furthermore, it follows a fortiori, viz.: If for the husband, who does not achieve exclusivity (of prerogative in the area of his wife's vows), silence on the day of his hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow, then the father, who does (occasionally) achieve exclusivity, how much more so should silence on the day of his hearing be equated with (silence on) the day of the vow! — No, this may be true of the husband, who annuls (her vows) when she has matured, (as opposed to her father who does not), wherefore silence on the day of his hearing is not equated with (silence on) the day of the vow. Not having succeeded with (pure) ratiocination (we turn to Scripture, viz.:) It is written (Ibid. 17) "These are the statutes which the L-rd commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter": The father is likened to the husband, viz.: Just as with the husband, "constraint" is annulment, and silence on the day of his hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow, towards confirmation — so with the father. (Ibid. 6) "and the L-rd will forgive her": If she (one's wife) made a vow and he annulled it in his heart and she broke it (to her thinking) wilfully, whence is it derived that she requires forgiveness? From "and the L-rd will forgive her." Now does this not follow a fortiori? If vows which are (thus) annulled require forgiveness, how much more so vows which are not annulled! An analogy: One, thinking that he was eating swine's flesh ate lamb flesh instead. If he requires forgiveness, how much more so one who intended to eat swine's flesh and actually ate it! "for her father has constrained her": If she said: "I know that father would annul any vow that he heard," I might think it is annulled; it is, therefore, written "for her father has constrained her." If the father annuls it, it is annulled; if not, it is not annulled. If he said to a caretaker: "Any vows that my daughter makes from now until I return, annul them," and he did so, I might think that they are annulled; it is, therefore, written "for her father has constrained her." If her father annulled them, they are annulled; if not, they are not annulled. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: We find in all places that a man's messenger is like himself. (Bamidbar 30:7) "And if she be to a man, and her vows be upon her": This refers to one who is betrothed. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: In either case, (i.e., either betrothed or wed) Scripture comes to make a distinction, viz.: As long as she is in her father's house, her father and her husband (jointly) annul her vows. If she is wed, her father does not annul her vows. "and her vows be upon her": the vows that "came along" with her from her father's house to her husband's house. Whence do I derive (the same for) vows that she made on his (her husband's) domain? — Do you ask? It follows a fortiori, viz.: If he annuls vows that she vowed not in his domain, how much more so vows that she made in his domain! Variantly: "and her vows be upon her": (Can the husband annul only) vows which were never confirmed (in her father's house) or even vows which were confirmed there? It follows (inductively), viz.: The husband annuls and the father annuls. Just as the father annuls only vows which were never confirmed or annulled, so, the husband. And, furthermore, it follows a fortiori, viz.: If the father, who has an exclusive prerogative (over his daughter's vows) can annul only vows which were never confirmed, how much more so, the husband, who does not have such a prerogative! — No, this may be true of the father, who does not annul in her maturity — wherefore he annuls only vows which were never confirmed, as opposed to the husband, who does annul (the vows of her) maturity — wherefore he can annul every vow, (even those confirmed in her father's house)? Not having succeeded with (pure) ratiocination, we must revert to Scripture, viz.: "These are the statutes which the L-rd commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter. Scripture likens the husband to the father, viz.: Just as the father can annul only those vows which were never confirmed, so, the husband. "or the utterance (mivta) of her lips": "bitui" (like "mivta") connotes an oath, as in (Vayikra 5:4) "Or if a soul swear 'levatei' with his lips." (Bamidbar 30:8) "And her husband hear": to exclude one who is deaf. "And her husband hear": This tells me only of his own hearing. Whence do I derive (the same for) others' hearing (and reporting it to him? From (9) "And if on the day of her husband's hearing." (Ibid. 8) "and he be silent to her." He must intend her. If his wife vowed, and he said: "I thought it was my daughter," he may annul it later (see above), it being written "and he be silent to her." He must intend her. "then all of her vows shall stand": If she vowed and he confirmed (her vow by his silence), and he later annulled it, I might think that it is annulled. And how would I understand "then all of her vows shall stand"? If he did not annul them. Or, even if he did annul them, and how would I understand (9) "and he annul her vow"? If he had not confirmed it. Or, even if he did confirm it? (See the same discussion vis-à-vis one's daughter above.) It is, therefore, written "they shall stand," Scripture apprising us that any vow which was confirmed at the time cannot thereafter be annulled. (Bamidbar 30:9) "And if on the day that her husband hear, he constrain her and annul her vow": We learn vis-à-vis the husband that "constraint" is annulment and vis-à-vis the husband that silence on the day of his hearing is equated with (silence on) the day of the vow. "and he annul her vow": He can annul the vows that are upon her (i.e., that she has already made), and not the vows that are not upon her (i.e., those that she is destined to make.) R. Eliezer says that he can do so, and that it follows a fortiori, viz.: If where he cannot annul the vows that he has made, he can annul the vows that he is destined to make, then where he can annul the vows that his wife has made, how much more so can he annul the vows that she is destined to make! They (the sages) said to him: No, it is written "and he annul her vow which is upon her." He can annul those vows which she has already made, but not those which are not yet upon her. Variantly (Ibid. 14) "Her husband shall confirm it and her husband shall annul it": What (already) came to confirmation can come to annulment. What did not (yet) come to confirmation (i.e., those vows that she is destined to make) are not subject to (proactive) annulment. "and the L-rd will forgive her": If she vowed and he annulled it in his heart, and she went and broke (what she thought to be a standing vow) wilfully — whence is it derived that she requires forgiveness? From "and the L-rd will forgive her."
Sifrei Bamidbar 153
Tap any verse to see what it echoes — and start a chain or echo from it.