1) (Vayikra 1:2): "Speak to the children of Israel … (Vayikra 1:4) and he shall place his hand on the head of the burnt-offering" — The children of Israel perform semichah (the placing of the hands), and gentiles do not perform semichah. Now which measure is greater? That of tenufah (waving the devoted portions) or that of semichah? The measure of tenufah is greater. For tenufah obtains both with things that have a spirit of life (i.e., animals) and with things that do not have a spirit of life (e.g., first-fruits, the two breads, etc.), whereas semichah obtains only with things that have a spirit of life. If I exclude them (gentiles) from tenufah, the greater measure, (as the Torah does, indeed, exclude them), should I not exclude them from semichah, the lesser measure! (so that the exclusion verse for semichah would seem to be superfluous) Perceived thus, tenufah is (indeed) the greater measure, and semichah, the lesser. But perceived otherwise, semichah is the greater measure and tenufah, the lesser. For semichah obtains with all partners (to the offering), but not tenufah. If they (gentiles) are excluded from tenufah, the lesser measure, would I (without the verse) exclude them from semichah, the greater? So that because there obtains with tenufah what does not obtain with semichah, and with semichah, what does not obtain with tenufah, it must be written "Speak to the children of Israel, etc." — The children of Israel perform semichah, and not the gentiles. 2) ("Speak to the sons of Israel, etc.") — the sons of Israel perform semichah, and not the daughters of Israel. R. Yossi and R. Shimon say: Women (though not obligated to do so) may perform semichah. R. Yossi said: Abba Elazar once told me: We had a calf for the peace-offerings, and we took it out to the women's quarter, where the women placed their hands upon it — not because semichah obtains with women, but for their gratification. I might think that they do not perform semichah upon burnt-offerings, which do not require tenufah, but they do perform semichah upon peace-offerings, which require tenufah; it is, therefore, written (Vayikra 1:4): "and say to them" ("b'nei Yisrael") — to include all that is mentioned in that context. Just as they do not perform semichah upon burnt-offerings, they do not perform semichah upon peace-offerings. 3) [(Vayikra 1:2): "A man, if he offer of you, a sacrifice to the L–rd"] "A man" — to include proselytes; "of you" — to exclude heretics. Why do you see it that way? Why not: "A man" — to include heretics; "of you" — to exclude proselytes? After Scripture includes, it excludes, viz. (Vayikra 1:2): "the children of Israel." Just as the children of Israel are accepters of the covenant, so proselytes — to exclude heretics, who do not accept the covenant. — But why not say: Just as the children of Israel are children of accepters of the covenant, so, heretics — to exclude proselytes, who are not! It is, therefore, written "of you" (i.e., like you, in your deeds). So that, perforce, we must understand it as: Just as Israel are accepters of the covenant, so, proselytes — to exclude heretics, who are not, having broken the covenant. And thus is it written (Mishlei 21:27): "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination." 4) "A man, if he offer, etc." I might think this is a decree (i.e., that he must do so), it is, therefore, written "if he offer" — it is optional. (Mishlei 21:27): "a sacrifice (korban) to the L–rd" — he must sanctify it (by saying "This is a burnt-offering") before offering it up, (thus rendering it a "korban" before he actually sacrifices it). These are the words of R. Yehudah. R. Shimon said: Whence is it derived that one should not say: "To the L–rd, a burnt-offering," "To the L–rd, a meal-offering," "To the L–rd, peace-offerings?" From "a sacrifice (korban) to the L–rd." Now is this not a kal vachomer? If in respect to what is destined to be sanctified, Scripture states that the name of Heaven is to be mentioned only after "korban" (to forestall the possibility of its being mentioned in vain by his saying "To the L–rd," and not following up with "korban") — how much more so must the name of Heaven not be mentioned in vain (in mundane circumstances)! 5) R. Yossi says: Wherever "korban" is written, it is stated (only) in conjunction with Yod-Keh (the Tetragrammaton) so as not to provide an "opening" for heretics (as it would, if alternate names were used). 6) (Vayikra 1:2): "… an offering to the L–rd from the beasts (behemah)": I might think (that this permitted) even (non-domesticated) animals, which are also subsumed in "behemah," viz. (Devarim 14:4): "These are the beasts (behemah) that you may eat: the ox, the sheep … the hart and the roebuck" (animals); it is, therefore, written (Vayikra, Ibid.): "from the cattle and from the sheep" (domesticated). I might think that he should not bring ("animals"), but if he did bring them they are permitted — as when one's master tells him: "Go and bring me wheat," and he goes and brings him wheat and barley, in which instance he (merely) adds to his master's words; it is, therefore, written: "from the cattle and from the sheep shall you offer" — i.e., from the beasts shall you offer cattle and sheep alone. This is analogous to one's master telling him: "Bring me only wheat, in which instance, if he adds (barley) to wheat, he transgresses his master's words. 7) "from the beasts" (but not all) — to exclude (animals used for sodomy), rovea (active) and nirva (passive). Now does this not follow by kal vachomer? (Why is a verse needed to exclude them? (the kal vachomer:) If an animal with a blemish, which was not the object of transgression, is pasul (unfit) for the altar, rovea and nirva, which were objects of transgression, does it not follow that they should be unfit for the altar? 8) — No, this is refuted by the instance of an ox plowing together with an ass, where, even though the ox was the object of transgression, it is kasher for the altar. — No, in that instance the animals are not to be killed, whereas rovea and nirva are to be killed. — "Take what you have brought" (i.e., let us grant this); still, (without the exclusion clause) I would know that they (rovea and nirva) are pasul only if they were the (proved) objects of transgression by the testimony of two witnesses. If there were only one witness, or only the testimony of the owner, whence would I derive this (that they are pasul, if not for the exclusion clause?) R. Yishmael said: I could derive it through a kal vachomer, viz.: If a blemished animal, which is not made pasul for eating by the testimony (to the blemish) of two witnesses, is made pasul for sacrifice by the testimony of one witness or of the owner — then rovea and nirva, which are made pasul for eating by the testimony of two witnesses, should they not be made pasul for sacrifice by the testimony of one witness or of the owner? (What need, then, is there for the exclusion clause?) R. Akiva said: No, (i.e., your argument does not stand.) In the instance of a blemished animal, the blemish is visible, whereas in the instance of rovea and nirva, the "blemish" is not visible, so that (without the exclusion clause), they would not be pasul for the altar. It must, therefore, be written "from the beasts," to exclude rovea and nirva. 9) "from the cattle" (but not all) — to exclude ne'evad (objects of idolatry). Now does this not follow by kal vachomer? (Why is the exclusion clause necessary?) (the kal vachomer:) If an ethnan (the hire of a prostitute) [see Devarim 23:19]) and a mechir (the exchange of a dog [Devarim 23:19], whose ornaments are permitted (for mundane use), are forbidden for the altar — then ne'evad, whose ornaments are forbidden (see Devarim 7:25) — how much more so should it be forbidden for the altar! (Why, then, is an exclusion clause needed?) — But perhaps the reverse is true, viz.: If the ethnan and mechir, which are forbidden for the altar, (yet) their ornaments are permitted (for mundane use) — then ne'evad, which is permitted (for the altar [barring an exclusion clause]) — how much more so should its ornaments be permitted! — You have (hereby) abolished (Devarim 7:25) "Do not covet the silver and gold upon them!" I shall restore it, viz.: "Do not covet the silver and gold" of things (i.e., their images) which do not have a spirit of life. But things (i.e., their cattle), which do have a spirit of life, if they are permitted (for the altar), how much more so should their ornaments be permitted! It is, therefore, written "from the cattle" — to exclude ne'evad. 10) Why need it be written below (Vayikra 1:3): "from the cattle"? ("If his offering is a burnt-offering from the cattle, etc.") To exclude treifah (a "torn," ritually unfit animal). Now does this not follow by kal vachomer? If a blemished animal, which is permitted for mundane purposes (i.e., eating), is pasul for the altar, treifah, which is forbidden for mundane purposes, how much more so should it be pasul for the altar! — This is refuted by cheilev (forbidden fats) and blood, which are forbidden for mundane purposes, yet kasher for the altar! — No (i.e., this is no refutation of the kal vachomer, for) forbidden fats and blood come from a thing (i.e., an animal) which is permitted (for mundane purposes), unlike treifah, which is entirely forbidden (for such purposes)! — This is refuted by melikah ("pinching" a bird's neck [as opposed to shechitah]), which is entirely forbidden (for mundane purposes), yet kasher for the altar! — No, (this is no refutation, for) the very thing that makes it kadosh (holy, for an offering), i.e., melikah, renders it forbidden (for mundane purposes), whereas with treifah, it is not the thing that makes it kadosh which renders it forbidden (for mundane purposes), and since this is so, it should be pasul for the altar! (Why, then, do we need an exclusion clause for treifah?) — Now that this refutation has been countered (at its origin, [viz., R. Akiva 8) above], so that the kal vachomer stands), what is the thrust of "from" (but not all) the cattle"? To exclude treifah. 11) (Vayikra 1:2): "from the sheep" — to exclude muktzeh (an animal designated for idolatry); "and from the sheep" — to exclude noge'ach (an animal which gored a man to death). If rovea is excluded, why need noge'ach be (separately) excluded? And if noge'ach is excluded, why need rovea be excluded? For there is that in rovea (prompting exclusion) which is lacking in noge'ach, and there is that in noge'ach which is lacking in rovea, viz.: With rovea, forcing (the animal to be rovea) was equated with volition (i.e., in both instances, the animal must be killed); with noge'ach, forcing was not equated with volition (i.e., only in the latter instance is the animal killed). (The owners of) noge'ach pay kofer (indemnity) after (the animal has been put to) death; rovea (in an instance where the woman dies as a result) does not pay indemnity after death. There is that in rovea which is lacking in ne'evad, and that in ne'evad which is lacking in rovea. Rovea, whether one's own animal or another's is forbidden (for the altar); ne'evad — one's own (animal that he made an object of idolatry) is forbidden; another's (animal that he made an object of idolatry) is permitted (for the altar, one not voiding what is not his). Rovea — its ornaments are permitted; ne'evad — its ornaments are forbidden. Therefore, Scripture must adduce all (of these exclusions).
Sifra Nedavah Section 2
Tap any verse to see what it echoes — and start a chain or echo from it.