1) (Vayikra 4:23) ("If his sin becomes known to him wherein he has sinned in it"): "becomes known" — and not that others tell him. If not for this clause I would say (that he does not bring a sin-offering) only if his bondswoman, (who is "not fit to enter the congregation") informs him (that he has sinned). Whence would I derive (the same) even for his wife informing him? I would exclude his wife (even without the clause), for a woman is not kasher to testify. Whence would I derive (the same) even for relatives informing him? I would exclude relatives, who are not kasher to testify. Whence would I derive (the same) even for a single witness? I would exclude a single witness, who can only make one liable for an oath. Whence would I exclude even two witnesses? It is, therefore, written, (because I would not exclude them otherwise): "becomes known to him" — and not that others tell him. 2) I might think (that he does not bring a sin-offering) even if he does not refute (the witnesses, but remains silent). It is, therefore, written (to negate this): "if it becomes known." I would include (as making him liable for a sin-offering in such an instance, only) two witnesses, who can make him liable to the death penalty (where it applies). Whence would I derive (the same) even for one witness? I would include one witness (even without the clause), for he can make him liable for an oath (where it applies). Whence would I derive (the same) even for two relatives? I would include two relatives, who are kasher to testify for others. Whence would I derive (the same) even for his wife? even for his bondswoman? It is, therefore, written, (because I would not include these otherwise): "if it becomes known" (in any instance of his remaining silent). 3) R. Meir said (in refutation of the above [i.e., that even if two witnesses inform him and he refutes them he is not liable for a sin-offering]): If two witnesses can bring him to death — the severe (liability), can they not bring him to an offering — the lesser! R. Yehudah said (in refutation of R. Meir): (This is no kal vachomer, for) How can they tell him: "Stand and confess," when he says: "I have not sinned!" (i.e., Atonement is a "personal" matter, and if he does not wish it, witnesses cannot force him to it.) R. Shimon said (Also, in refutation of R. Meir's kal vachomer): If he said (to the witnesses): "I did it intentionally," he would not be liable (for a sin-offering, so that, ab initio, witnesses cannot "bring him" to a sin-offering). 4) R. Meir says (in answer to R. Shimon): If he says in the beginning (to the witnesses who testified that he sinned): "I sinned intentionally," he is believed (not to bring a sin-offering), but if he disputed with them the whole day (saying that he had not committed the sin at all), and at the end he said: "I sinned intentionally," he is not believed (and must bring a sin-offering as having sinned unwittingly). 5) Similarly, R. Meir said: If they (witnesses) said to him: "You are a Nazirite" (i.e., You made a Nazirite vow and [then] you defiled yourself and must now bring an offering for having done so) — If he said: "I made the vow on condition" (and the condition was not realized), he is believed. But if he tired them the whole day (saying that he had not made the vow), and, in the end, he said: "I made the vow on condition," he is not believed. 6) ("If his sin becomes known to him) wherein he has sinned in it": What is the intent of this? Whence do we derive (the halachah vis-à-vis liability for a sin-offering in a situation in which) his wife (who was) a niddah and his sister were with him in the house and he sinned unwittingly with one of them and did not know with which; Shabbath and Yom Kippur, (one following the other), and he performed a (forbidden) labor on one of them at twilight and did not know on which; cheilev (forbidden fats) and nothar (left-over consecrated flesh) before him, and he ate of one of them (cheilev or nothar) and did not know which (What is the halachah?) R. Eliezer makes him liable for a sin-offering and R. Yehoshua exempts him. 7) R. Eliezer queried him: Whatever the case — If he lived with his wife, a niddah, he is liable; if he lived with his sister he is liable! If he desecrated the Sabbath he is liable; if he desecrated Yom Kippur he is liable! If he ate cheilev he is liable; if he ate nothar he is liable! R. Yehoshua replied: It is written: "wherein he has sinned" — He is not liable until his (specific) sin becomes known to him. 8) R. Yossi said: Both agree that if he performs a labor between the two twilights (i.e., beginning a labor on one day and completing it on the next) he is exempt, for I (then) say: He did part of it today and part on the next day. Where do they argue? Where he performs an (entire) labor on one day, but he does not know whether that day was Shabbath or Yom Kippur, or where he performs a (forbidden) labor, but he does not know which labor he performed. R. Eliezer rules that he is liable for a sin-offering, and R. Yehoshua, that he is exempt. R. Yehudah said: R. Yehoshua would exempt him even from an asham talui (see Ibid. 5:17 and 18). 9) R. Shimon and R. Shimon Shazuri say: Both agree that (if he is in doubt about) an act which goes by the same name (i.e., If he knows that he "plucked figs from a tree," but he does not know from which tree he plucked them), he is liable. Where do they argue? Where (he is in doubt about an act where) two names are involved (e.g., if he is in doubt as to whether he "reaped" or "ground"), in which instance R. Eliezer rules that he is liable for a sin-offering, and R. Yehoshua, that he is exempt. And R. Yehudah says: R. Yehoshua would exempt him even in the instance of an act which goes by the same name. 10) How so? His two wives, niddoth, and his two sisters with him in the house — he intended to live with one and he lived with the other; figs and grapes (on trees) before him — he intended to pluck figs and he plucked grapes, or grapes and he plucked figs; black ones and he plucked white ones, or white ones and he plucked black ones — R. Eliezer rules that he is liable for a sin-offering, and R. Yehoshua, that he is exempt. But why should R. Yehoshua exempt him? (Does he not, in any event, intend to commit a sin?) But if so, (if R. Yehoshua would rule him to be liable in such an instance), what is the intent of "wherein he has sinned in it"? (i.e., What is excluded from a sin-offering by "in it"?) Mithasek (intending to do) [a permitted thing] and doing [a forbidden one]) is excluded (e.g., intending to cut what is torn off [the tree] and cutting what is attached).
Sifra Chovah Chapter 7
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